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Author’s Note: This is an extended version of the paper I presented at the 2016 Hayes Graduate 
Research Forum – Humanities Division. Thus, it reads much like an oral presentation, rather 
than a formally written piece of scholarship. It draws upon some of my dissertation research, as 
well as certain sections and phrases from the dissertation itself, which will not be published until 
July 2016. Footnotes were not originally included in the paper as it was written for oral 
presentation, and these were only inserted for this submission. Please contact the author if there 
are any concerns about citations. 
 
Between 218 and 216 BC, over half of the 300 members of the Roman Senate perished 
while serving against the armies of Hannibal of Carthage.1 These were staggering losses which 
were unprecedented in the centuries-long history of the Republic’s principal governing 
institution. As we will see, the dead likely amounted to virtually the entire generation of eminent 
men of military age within the Senate, that is, of Roman nobles aged 18 to 45, who were all but 
eradicated. As might be expected, the consequences of this decimation of Rome’s ruling class 
                                                          
1 The most reliable source for this narrative can be found in Livy Books 22-24. 
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were momentous. Indeed, I argue that the replacement in the Senate of this lost generation with 
mostly young, politically inexperienced, and relatively undistinguished men eventually resulted 
in a decade of political rupture in the Republic. Ultimately, with the death of over half of the 
Senate’s members, the century-long movement from oligarchic to aristocratic control over the 
state underwent a temporary, though significant, reversal. 
Undoubtedly, much of this thesis will only be useful, or perhaps even decipherable, to a 
specialist audience of ancient historians. What is perhaps more generally relevant to those who 
work in the history of any era, indeed even in any discipline, however, is the way in which 
demographic disruption acted as a key agent here in influencing large-scale political and social 
trends. What I hope to accomplish today, then, in light of the varied areas of study at the 
conference, is two-fold. First, as I said, I would like to present one episode within the Roman 
world when the loss of a generation of elites interrupted the steady development of collective 
aristocratic rule. My second goal is a bit more methodological. While laying out the larger 
argument, I hope to highlight some of the potential advantages of incorporating demographic 
factors into any multi-causal analysis of political and social change.  
Before we can engage with all of this directly, however, it seems prudent to lay out some 
of the basic features of the Roman Republic in order to clarify my arguments a bit further. I have 
no doubt that many of you have seen Gladiator, which is, of course, a flawless depiction of 
governance during the Roman Empire; the Republic, unfortunately, is quite different, and so 
some cursory remarks are necessary here. While the Roman Republic of the late third century 
BC was technically a direct democracy in the sense that nearly all officials were elected directly 
by the public and because ratification by public vote was necessary for nearly all official 
measures, effective political power lay in the hands of the 300 men who made up the Roman 
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Senate.2 The institutional basis of senatorial control in this period is a bit convoluted, and need 
concern us only briefly.3 In essence, when the Republic was faced with a pressing issue foreign 
or domestic, a publicly elected official would consult the Senate for its suggestions. The Senate, 
after internal deliberation, would then promulgate its consulta, or its opinions on the matter, 
which instructed the magistrate on how to proceed. Occasionally, this could include the drafting 
of a bill which would be presented before an assembly of citizens for ratification. Both the 
adherence of Rome’s magistrates to the directives of the Senate, as well as the formal approval 
of consulta by the assemblies, subsequently turned senatorial recommendations into law and 
state action.  
Clearly, then, the Senate was a principal force in the political processes of the Republic. 
Indeed, it is remarkable that during the period of the Middle Republic, the Assemblies almost 
never rejected the consulta of the Senate, and magistrates rarely subverted the Senate’s 
prerogatives by acting contrary to that body’s wishes.4 Yet, Rome had no constitution in the 
modern sense, and there are no strictly legal reasons to explain why either the magistrates or the 
assemblies of citizens were not themselves sovereign. Instead, in order to explain the 
preeminence of the Senate, we must look to the political shifts of the centuries preceding 
Hannibal’s invasion, namely the fourth and third centuries.5 By briefly examining these changes, 
we will be better positioned to see how the loss of a generation of nobles so dramatically 
                                                          
2 Cf. Karl-J, Hölkeskamp, Die Entstehung der Nobilität. Studien zur sozialen und politischen Geschichte der 
Römischen Republik im 4. Jhdt. V.Chr (Stuttgart, 1987) and Reconstructing the Roman Republik. An Ancient Political 
Culture and Modern Research (Princeton, 2010) for more on this.  
3 A basic primer can be found in Andrew Lintott, The Constitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford, 1999) 65-93.  
4 For a somewhat different picture, cf. Arthur Eckstein, Senate and General: Individual Decision-Making and Roman 
Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC (UCLA, 1987) and Bruno Bleckmann, Die römische Nobilität im Ersten Punischen 
Krieg. Untersuchungen zur aristokratischen Konkurrenz in der Republik (Berlin, 2002).  
5 Again, Hölkeskamp (1987) is instructive for this. 
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disrupted the transition from a regime of charismatic oligarchs towards a collective aristocracy of 
office-holders. 
 One of the key elements accounting for this transition to senatorial preeminence was the 
evolution of membership within the Senate. Before the late 4th century BC, Rome’s chief annual 
magistrates determined who could attend the Senate at each occasion of its meeting.6 Since 
selection was thus arbitrary, ad hoc, and relatively fluid, the Senate proved to be a weak 
institution because its members lacked both the incentives and the capacity to oppose the wishes 
of those who called on them for advice. Essentially, no one wants to tell their boss that he’s 
making a real Roman mess of things. Further, the chief offices of the Republic in this early 
period were frequently monopolized by charismatic individuals or by powerful families. As a 
result, the Republic was largely in the hands of these men, whose re-elections secured their 
predominance. During the great upheavals of the late 4th century BC, however, an important shift 
occurred. Selection of senators passed from the hands of these powerful men and into the hands 
of two censors, one patrician and one plebeian, who would be elected every five years. 
Collegiality here was no accident or symbol. The commonly accepted view is that the Republic 
had been divided along patrician and plebeian lines since its 6th century inception. The presence 
of two censors was thus very likely an attempt at compromise between the groups in order to 
ensure cohesion. 
Of course, these two censors, one patrician and the other plebeian, were prone to 
disagreement over who should be selected into the limited number of senatorial positions 
available. In order to avoid political gridlock, more objective standards for cooptation would be 
                                                          




necessary. Over the course of the 4th and 3rd centuries, my dissertation argues that a custom 
developed that these censors would select as senators only those who had been elected to the 
Republic’s most prestigious offices. In this way, objectivity in selection could be claimed, and 
the People, through their popular vote, would be integrated into the new system as the ultimate 
arbiters of admission into the political aristocracy. All of this fundamentally altered the Roman 
Republic. What this transformation of membership in the Senate brought about was the 
emergence of a new, hierarchically-arranged aristocracy of office-holders in the Senate, an 
aristocracy which was both meritocratic and semi-hereditary: Meritocratic because election to 
the requisite magistracy depended on distinguished military service and the reputation this 
service brought; and semi-hereditary because this reputation could be passed down as both social 
and political capital for future generations to use.  
Still, the explanation for the obedience of the Roman People and its magistrates to the 
Senate is far too complex to be ascribed to this single institutional development. Instead, we 
should point also to the socio-political phenomenon known in Latin as auctoritas, which in many 
respects lies at the heart of the Senate’s pre-eminence. ‘Auctoritas’ is the root of our own word 
‘authority’, and this is actually a helpful way of imagining its function in the Roman context. For 
our purposes, the word signifies a range of types of influence or coercion, whether social, 
political, economic, or otherwise. An individual’s auctoritas was tightly linked to the deeds and 
accomplishments which supported his election, as well as to his membership and rank within the 
nobility. Indeed, each individual senator had, to varying degrees, his own level of auctoritas 
depending on his rank and achievements, and this auctoritas was politically vital. It lent the 
senator added weight within senatorial debate, and also in future elections. During policy 
disputes, we might imagine each side of the argument as a sum of the auctoritas of its members. 
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Once one side reached a critical mass, the other side might be overawed and debate officially 
over. Yet, at the end of such deliberations, the Senate would present a united front. Expressed 
collectively, the auctoritas of all of these individual Senators made their will essentially 
irresistible. As a result, the Senate’s final decisions on any issue would almost always be 
accepted. 
At the same time, however, the auctoritas of each senator was a powerful tool for 
keeping other nobles in check. We’ve seen that the Roman state was, at its heart, an aristocracy, 
which was both meritocratic and semi-hereditary. As one might imagine, members of this 
aristocracy were obsessed with the continuity of their families within the political elite. Fair 
access to legitimate elections was therefore critical. As a result, this new aristocracy of office 
collectively feared the growth in power of any individual or group which might restrict the 
chances of electoral success for the broader elite. As a result, if any senator or clique of senators 
threatened to grow too powerful through, for instance, the monopolization of higher office or the 
intimidation of his peers, the collective Senate could, and often did, check them through any 
number of institutional and non-institutional restraints.  
Some brief summary will help us get our bearings before the final stage of the argument. 
The Roman Republic developed over the 4th and 3rd centuries into a state ruled by a collective 
aristocracy. This is in large part because the external expression of the auctoritas of the Senate 
made its policy decisions all but irresistible. At the same time, expressed inwardly, this same 
auctoritas functioned as a restraint mechanism on the ambitions of the Senate’s individual 
members. This was critical for maintaining internal harmony, especially because those families 
which had dominated the Republic in earlier periods continued to be active, and, on top of that, 
the essence of the aristocratic ethos had remained in many ways unchanged. Individuals 
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continued to be impelled to compete aggressively with one another for primacy because this 
system required competitive election to preserve aristocratic status. Further, in order to move up 
the ranks within the aristocracy, and increase one’s own auctoritas, each stage on the rung of 
offices became increasingly competitive. The urge to outdo one’s rivals thus remained a 
fundamental feature of the Roman Republic throughout its existence. While this did much to 
channel aristocratic competition towards the benefit of the community, it did very little to temper 
the underlying drive of individual elites to dominate. Only with the newfound communal 
authority to restrain individuals attempting to control the state, authority which was now 
channeled through the institution of the Senate, was the rule by powerful men halted by the rise 
of collective governance. 
All of this finally brings us back both to our lost generation of senators and to the impact 
of a demographic crisis on political developments. We hear from the Roman author Livy that in 
216 BC, following a series of terrible losses against Hannibal, there were 177 vacancies within 
the Senate out of the total 300 spots. Using demographic tools called model life tables coupled 
with our ancient sources, we can reconstruct how these deaths affected the age and auctoritas 
structures within the Senate. To begin with, all men between the ages of 18 and 45 were liable 
for conscription. In the period of the Hannibalic War, when Rome was faced with a series of 
existential threats, mobilization among this warrior aristocracy would have been extremely high. 
Indeed, this would have been especially true within what was essentially a military aristocracy. 
Out of a Senate of 300, where the average age of entry would have been roughly 28 years old, 
our Model Life Tables predict that approximately 165 individuals would have been between 18 
and 45 years old. Considering our figure of 177 vacancies, we can again use the Model Life 
Tables to roughly calculate the effects of natural attrition within the population aged over 45 
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since the last census 4 years prior. This likely accounts for 25-35 of these 177 deaths. We are 
thus left with about 140-150 surplus mortalities caused by non-natural causes which must in turn 
be attributable to war. Considering the figure of 165 men in the Senate who were aged between 
18 and 45, we find that the 140 to 150 men lost represents nearly all of the younger members of 
the Senate, indeed an entire generation of men still in the prime of their careers.  
The impact of their loss was dramatic. On the one hand, those senators still living fit into 
one of two groups: the first had competed successfully for the top positions in the Republic; the 
second were those who had dropped out of competition because they had no chance for an 
advanced political career. Putting these two groups of surviving senators to the side, the Latin 
author Livy tells us that the emergency replacements of those who had died were to be lesser 
aristocrats who either had been rejected for senatorial membership in the past, or who had 
previously failed even to qualify.7 Many of these new replacements had grown old, and most 
were unlikely to have accomplished much of note once their brief political careers had ended. 
Thus, not only would this group of replacements lack the auctoritas of those who had just 
perished, but the still-surviving senators were themselves divided between those who had 
achieved the loftiest offices of state on the one hand, and those who had been defeated in their 
attempts on the other. As might be expected, those older distinguished men who had largely 
retired from active politics and warfare stood as the only real candidates for leadership of the 
Republic. Without much reluctance, it appears, they rejoined the political fray.  
In the face of virtually no effective opposition, this junta of elder nobles came to 
dominate the political landscape for much of the remainder of the Hannibalic War. Now, to be 
                                                          
7 Cf. Livy 23.23 
9 
 
fair, most modern historians have looked at the years of war against Hannibal as a period of 
cooperation among the broader elite, who subordinated personal interest to the public good 
during a time of crisis. The larger body of senators, by this argument, collectively and 
purposefully allowed these older, more experienced men to lead the Republic until affairs had 
stabilized long enough to pass power back to the next generation. Unfortunately, I think this is 
hardly to be believed.8 In the years following the loss of a generation of senators, we have 
important examples of successful candidates from lesser families whose election results were 
deliberately stifled and rejected. Some who were running for the highest commands were even 
threatened with death if they chose to persist in their claim. Further, we hear that judicial 
tribunals and meetings of the Senate were moved outside of the gates of the city where they 
would not be protected by Rome’s sacred prohibitions against certain types of magisterial 
violence. We also hear relatively frequent reports that commanders in the field ignored directives 
of the Senate without consequences, which would be rare indeed outside of these circumstances. 
Indeed, for over a decade during the Hannibalic War, the monopolization of the Republic’s 
highest offices; the manipulation, and even hijacking, of elections in clear violation of precedent 
and protocol; and the domination of policy by a small group of charismatic men re-emerged as 
defining features of Republican politics, despite having largely disappeared over the preceding 
century.  
 I would like to end with a few words on the impact of this type of intense demographic 
shift. Ultimately, the rule of this regime proved to be a short-lived rupture in the movement 
towards collective governance. Still, I would argue that it had tremendous long-term 
consequences. As part of the reaction against this junta, Roman politics became far more 
                                                          
8 For this argument, cf. my upcoming dissertation to be published in July, 2016.  
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legalized and structured by the very generation which had been disenfranchised during the war. 
Many of the trends which emerged during the 4th and 3rd centuries to combat oligarchic rule, 
such as the customary prohibition against holding the same office twice, now became entrenched 
through law. The threat of a long-term return to a system of rule by the few, as well as the deaths 
of many of Rome’s elites, also opened up the aristocracy considerably. When looking for an 
explanation for these developments, it would be disingenuous to point to demographic collapse 
as their sole cause. Still, if we are looking for triggers for such changes, we should understand 
that demographic shifts can play a role much like that played by institutional reconfigurations. 
On their own, neither a demographic nor a political argument can adequately explain the 
dramatic changes which took place during and after the Hannibalic War. On the other hand, any 
explanation that excludes demographic or institutional causes will unnecessarily risk being 
largely incomplete. The demographic toolbox, then, should be one that we always keep handy 
when dealing with these types of larger political and social changes.  
 
 
 
